The Economic and Financial Reasons for Corporate Property Outsourcing in Europe

Prof. Dr. Ingrid Nappi-Choulet, ESSEC Business School, Paris, France.

Presented at IPD European Property Strategies Conference 2002

Introduction

This is part of a longer paper, commissioned by IPD, to analyse the importance and the weight of the corporate property outsourcing movement in Europe over the last four years. It aims to identify the main motives behind such a corporate strategy and to describe the outsourcing process. The research for it included a survey of existing European literature and also interviews with property advisors, property companies and institutional investors.

Corporate real estate is defined in this paper as corporate property - industrial, office and retail space - used for business purposes, as an input in the production process. Corporate real estate outsourcing thus means any sale of corporate operating properties that are initially owner-occupied, but which continue to be used by the same organisation. It does not include divestment of non-operating property.

The surge in institutional investment and financial globalisation, at a time when macroeconomic fundamentals were favourable, created a new context for corporate real estate strategy and real estate financing decisions. And due to the recovery of corporate real estate markets in Europe, cost reduction through real estate outsourcing became a strategic lever for increasing shareholder value for companies whose core business was not real estate. This paper examines the main motives which led property owners to sell their real estate assets and outsource property management.

Features of European Property Outsourcing

The recent European movement to outsource real estate functions began in the UK public sector, but rapidly took hold throughout the more advanced continental European economies, and soon spread from the government to the business sector.

Public sector outsourcing of facilities management can be traced back to the start of the UK Private Finance Initiative in 1992, culminating in the PRIME contract between the Department of Social Security and a consortium led by Goldman Sachs and Trillium, closely followed by the STEPS arrangement between the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise on the one hand and the Mapeley consortium on the other (see Table 1). These have been followed in continental Europe by the outsourcing of property held by the German post office (Deutsche Post), the French energy organisation EDF, as well as by smaller contracts in Spain and Sweden.

Table 1 - Top corporate property outsourcing deals in the public sector

Seller	Country	Date	Characteristics of the transaction	Value EURm
Administration				**11,300**
PRIME	UK	1998	Sale of a portfolio of 700 properties, 1.7m m², 20-year lease.	8,100
STEPS	UK	2000	Sale of a portfolio of 780 properties; 14m m².	3,200
Energy Group				**1,704**
EDF	France	2000	Sale of a SELEC portfolio of 12,800 housings	773
EDF	France	2001	Sale of a portfolio of 16,000 housings	168
EDF	France	2001	Sale of a portfolio of 60 buildings, 500,000 m²,	533
EDF	France	2001	Sale of former Paris office headquarter, 80,000m².	183
Gas Natural	Spain	2001	Sale of headquarter office building.	28
Gas Natural	Spain	2001	Sale of Two office buildings	19
National Post Office				**5,400**
Deutsche Post	Germany	2001	Sale of a proporty portfolio (residential and office), 3.5m m².	5,100
Swedish Post Office	Sweden	2000	Sale of a porfolio of 73 post office properties, 324,000 m²	300
			TOTAL	**18,404**

Source: press articles

These public sector trends were soon paralleled in the corporate sphere, with sale and leaseback deals most prominent in the telecom, retail and engineering industries (see Table 2). Most outsourcing has been implemented by highly-geared companies, under severe pressure to offload non-core assets. Different types of operational property have been outsourced; technical premises needed for the company's business have usually been leased back long-term, while buildings (often offices) used for routine purposes have generally been leased for shorter periods. The outsourcing of real estate assets combined with long-term facility management contracts - typically 20-30 years – has been almost exclusive to the UK where commercial leases are longer. In other European countries most contracts cover much shorter periods.

Transactions have so far been large, slow and costly to complete**.** This is partly because no common deal structure exists, nor is there a model for sale and leaseback agreements. In the UK, for example, large SLB deals have been contracted on the basis of different models.

Table 2 – Main corporate property outsourcing deals in the private sector

Seller	Country	Date	Characteristics of the transaction	Value EURm
Engeenering industries				**137**
Thalès	France	2001	Sale of a portfolio of 23 industrial sites, 670,000m².	46
Thomson Multimedia	France	2000	Sale of French headquarter	91
Retailer				**6,972**
Carrefour	France	2000	Sale of a portfolio of 47shoppping malls in Europe	1,500
Carrefour	France	2001	Sale of 9 stores located in Spain.	540
Carrefour	France	2002	Sale of 8 warehouses facilities, 3.5m m²	105
Kingfisher	UK	2001	Sale of the freehold of 182 stores in the UK.	990
Marks and Spencer	UK	2001	Sale of a portfolio of 78 stores in UK.	580
Sainbury	UK	2001	Sale of a portfolio of 16 food stores, 23-year lease.	557
Metro	Germany	1999	Sale of a portfolio of 290 stores in Europe	2,700
Telecom Operator				**11,650**
British Telecom	UK	2001	SLB deal of 6,700 buildings, 5.4m m² , 30-year agreements.	3,800
Deutsche Telekom / Sireo	Germany	2001		1,100
France Telecom	France	2001	Sale of a portfolio of 473 buildings, 3.1m m².	3,000
SwissCom	Switzerlan	2000	Sale of a portfolio of 162 buildings	850
Telecom Italia	Italy	2000	Sale of 581 properties, 3.7m m²,most of properties are rented on 21-year lease	2,900
			TOTAL	**18,759**

(Source: press articles)

A New Economic and Financial Environment for Corporate Real Estate

The trend towards property outsourcing and divestment was fuelled by financial, economic and institutional forces. Of these the globalisation of financial markets and the internationalisation of firms improved the management of shareholder value, and increased pressure for the outsourcing of real estate assets and the real estate corporate function.

Institutional investors, financial markets and corporate governance

In Europe, the rapid emergence of the property outsourcing market undoubtedly originated in the globalisation of financial markets and the surge of institutional investment in the European financial landscape, two trends which were unfolding at the same time. The growth of Anglo-Saxon investment funds, pension funds and mutual funds in the United States and Europe was one of the key features affecting both the financial and property environments.

During the 1990s institutional investors were the major collectors of savings and suppliers of funds to the financial markets. Today they exercise a dominant influence on developments in primary and secondary securities markets, the money market and the foreign exchange market (OECD, 2001). Numerous reports assert that the development of the professional asset management industry has implications for many different aspects of the financial landscape: market turnover, securities insurance, international capital flows, industrial organisation and corporate governance (Bank for International Settlements, 1998). It can be added that the huge impact of institutional investors on financial markets also significantly affects property markets as well.

Institutional investment growth in the global financial system can clearly be seen by the volume of financial assets under management. For many industrial countries, the value of these financial assets exceeds their annual GDP (see Table 3). This is particularly evident in the US, the UK and the Netherlands, where in 1999 financial assets represented more than 200% of GDP. However, these shares vary widely among OECD countries: in France and Italy, financial assets amount to half the share of GDP that they represent in UK, at 118% and 94%, while Germany and Spain record still lower levels: 73% and 61%.

The leading EU country for institutional investment volume is the UK, where assets totalled $3,265 bn in 1999, followed by France ($1,696 bn), Germany ($1,529 bn) and Italy ($1,078 bn). Spanish assets totalled only $370 billion.

Pension funds rank first among institutional investors in terms of assets managed. In the US and in the UK, the value of the assets they manage has doubled since 1992, reaching $6,900 bn in 1999 in the US and $1,226 bn in the UK. This accounted for 36% of the institutional market in 1999; the share of foreign assets was also highest in pension fund portfolios (Bank for International Settlements, 1998).

Table 3 – Breakdown of financial assets of institutional investors by countries

Total Financial Assets : as a per cent of GDP				
	Institutional Investors		*Pension Funds*	
	1992	**1999**	**1992**	**1999**
Netherlands	132.8%	208.7%	76.0%	112.6%
United Kingdom	115.2%	226.7%	52.7%	85.1%
France	60.6%	117.9%		
Germany	33.8%	72.7%	2.9%	3.0%
Spain	20.4%	61.4%		
Italy	18.5%	93.6%	3.1%	4.2%
Sweden	75.7%	172.1%	1.6%	2.9%
United States	133.3%	208.7%	50.0%	74.7%

Volume of Financial Assets of Institutional Investors by Countries Billion US Dollars				
	Institutional Investors		*Pension Funds*	
	1992	**1999**	**1992**	**1999**
Netherlands	427.4	799.4	244.8	448.5
United Kingdom	1,207.2	3,264.8	552.4	1,226.3
France	800.6	1,695.7		
Germany	665.2	1,529.0	56.6	63.3
Spain	117.5	370.1	14.4	12.8
Italy	225.3	1,078.4	38.3	33.2
Sweden	187.3	322.4	3.9	
E.U.	*3,916.6*	*9,832.9*	*942.2*	*1,858.0*
United States	8,035.3	19,279.0	3,011.2	6,900.8
Total OCDE	**16,033.5**	**36,147.3**	**4,828.8**	**10,305.9**

Source: OECD

The wave of global liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets and the creation of the single currency market in Europe have led to increased cross-border activity. A further contributory factor has been the increase in public debt in the main industrialised countries, and the huge privatisation programs which have encouraged institutional investors, mainly American, to participate in the capital of major European listed firms (Plihon, 1999). And the expansion of private savings has been the major supply side factor increasing financial assets.

Over the last decade the huge increase in international capital flows and the globalisation of financial markets have helped modify relationships between organisations and the financial markets. Companies, particularly quoted ones, have adopted new rules of management, inspired by the corporate governance model (Jeffers et Magnier, 2002); this has been particularly evident in France and Germany.

The governance of the managerial firm has traditionally been conceptualised through two theoretical corporate governance models (OECD, 1998). These

models are essentially defined by the management control processes, the corporate culture and the organisational primary objectives:

- A stakeholder-oriented structure of corporate governance (particularly evident in Germany, Japan, and Sweden), where the management control process is exerted internally and is largely dependent on the board of directors rather than the dominant shareholders they represent. In this model, objectives of other stakeholders (banks, customers and employees) are also taken into account in managerial action.
- *A shareholder-oriented structure of corporate governance (particularly evident in the US and in the UK).* In this model, control is exerted externally by active financial markets, where shareholder objectives and rewards are given priority. The model focuses on a new paradigm for measuring performance, the market value of shareholders' assets.

Dieth (1998) notes that corporate ownership concentration and ownership intermediation are restricted as a result of US neo-classical capital market regulations. Since corporate ownership is highly fragmented, ownership intermediation by non financial enterprises is of less importance in the US than in Germany, where non financial enterprises as a group own 42% of the outstanding shares of listed domestic companies. Moreover, in the US, banks hold only 0.3% of all outstanding stock, whereas private households make up the largest group of shareholders, with 50% of corporate equities. Pension funds, which hold 29% of equities, are the second largest investor group.

Until the mid-1990s, shareholder value management had little influence on European management practices in highly regulated countries where the majority of companies had a traditional stakeholder-oriented structure of corporate governance, as was the case in France and in Germany. Because of growing pressure from financial markets and the rising level of Anglo-Saxon institutional investment in their capital, large German and French companies have recently changed their corporate governance principles. The adoption of a more shareholder-oriented model over the last five years has led to the highlighting of performance gaps (Morin, 1998; Gehrke and Zarlowski, 2001; Gehrke 2002).

In order to ensure goal congruence between the principal (shareholder) and the agent (manager), advocates of the shareholder value approach use valuation tools such as Economic Value Added (EVA) (Stewart 1991), to assess the profitability of a business or investment. These tools benchmark return on capital employed (ROCE) against the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) used to generate cash flows. A positive EVA indicates that companies generate returns in excess of their cost of capital, and are increasing shareholder value. In other words, these companies are viewed as value creators. Conversely companies which show negative EVA are value destroyers.

Originated in 1982 by the New York-based Stern Stewart, the concept of EVA has gained increasing influence since the mid-1990s in many countries and companies, becoming one of the major corporate management performance measures.

The macro economic environment

Another factor fuelling the growth of corporate outsourcing deals was the fall in interest rates which accompanied a reduced level of inflation in most of European countries. This meant that companies could borrow at the lowest interest rates for many years.

Low interest rates have encouraged companies to take on heavier debt burdens. This was especially true for mergers and acquisitions, where the debt/equity ratio has been very high, between 3% and 4%.

Moreover, although real estate has always been viewed as a defensive investment likely to counter the effects of inflation, the fall in inflation close to zero in recent years has caused companies to divest real estate holdings.

Background : Recent CRE Research Trends

Although corporate real estate and facilities represent significant portions of corporate balance sheets and operating expenses, their role in corporate strategy is relatively underdeveloped in Europe compared to the US (Roulac and al., 2002). In more recent German research on corporate real estate management, Schaefer concluded that real estate assets were under-managed by the vast majority of companies (Schaefer, 1999).

The first US studies to assess the share of the occupancy costs of corporate space in overall operating expenses (10-20% of operating expenses and nearly 50% of corporate net income according to Veale, 1989) date back to 1983, when Zeckhauser and Silverman observed that 25-40% of American firms' assets were invested in real estate. Veale's research confirmed that property assets were not managed efficiently and suffered for many years from a lack of attention (Veale 1989). More recently, Rodriguez and Sirmans (1998) estimated that occupancy and property costs were a company's second largest expense after wages.

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw theoretical research in the US on the effect of corporate real estate performance on SVM (Noha, 1993; Nourse and Roulac, 1993; Kimbler and Rutherford, 1993). More recently, the increasing importance of SVM in European management practice has led to an examination of real estate relative to shareholder value creation in France (Ernst & Young, 2000) and Germany (e.g. Grünert 1999 and references). Despite this new interest and attention in the business press,

relatively few academic papers have yet been published in Europe on this subject.

Optimising corporate real estate should increase shareholder returns by increasing revenues and lowering operational and capital costs. Recently, Manning, Rodriguez and Ghosh (1999) have studied the impact of corporate facility location decisions on shareholder wealth. While their conclusion underlines the financial significance of corporate property decisions, much thinking about corporate property costs and benefits continued to underestimate their contribution to corporate financial performance (Roulac, 2001).

Manning and Roulac (1999) provide a comprehensive review of the evolution of US academic research on corporate real estate from 1989 onwards. The authors have observed a decline in such research by academics in the latter half of the 1990s, but have noted greater activity in industry-initiated research, especially that by the IDRC and Nacore.

According to Nourse and Roulac (1993), most US corporate managers did not then have a formal real estate strategy and largely ignored property in their overall strategy. Although corporate real estate management has evolved significantly over recent decades and investment in corporate property has been very capital intensive, few companies have yet implemented explicit real estate strategies. These are identified by Roulac as: minimising occupancy cost, increasing flexibility, promoting human resources objectives, promoting the marketing message, promoting sales and selling processes, facilitating production, operations and delivery, facilitating the managerial process, and capturing the real estate value creation of the business. As Roulac observes, “Corporate property strategy is crucial to core competency. Its implementation determines enterprise access to resources and markets and also determines the settings in which the enterprise’s interactions and operations occur.”

In Europe corporate real estate management also appears relatively primitive. This field of management is not considered as a priority or a discipline, and receives little attention in business education, particularly in European business schools (Nappi-Choulet, 1999, Nappi, 2002). Moreover, real estate is not generally considered to be a strategic field for corporate management (leading to ignorance regarding real estate costs and facilities).

Property markets

In the economic and financial environment, the impact of EMU and the emergence of shareholder value management have contributed most to the development of corporate property strategies. The growth in property investment markets and their increasing globalisation are also influencing the property outsourcing environment.

Although Jones Lang LaSalle (2001) observed real diversity in Europe's property markets, particularly in terms of performance, the last three years have seen common trends starting to emerge. This has especially applied to office letting markets and cross-border investment.

In the main European countries common trends in real estate markets are emerging. This is the case for the prime office rental cycle. According to Jones Lang LaSalle's Quarter 4 2001 property clock - which illustrates the relative position of markets in their rental cycles – most of Europe's prime office letting markets were peaking. Rental growth slowed in most markets 1999-2001, leading to stable or falling prime rents in most cities (e.g. Berlin, London and Paris). Another common trend in Western Europe since 1999 has been unprecedented liquidity in property investment markets, driven by the favourable macroeconomic environment, and lower interest rates with the advent of the Euro. As investors look to diversify their portfolios, cross-border flows of investment have been increasing (see Graph 1). In 2001, of the total European real estate investment of Euros 54 bn, cross-border flows accounted for 34%. UK and France were the most favoured destinations for cross-border capital, attracting 51% of the total, while Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain each attracted 11%, and Germany only attracted 4%.

Graph 1 – European cross-border investments in Euros bn



Source: Jones Lang LaSalle

In France the volume of commercial property investment rose to Euros 12bn in 2001, its highest level ever, totally eclipsing activity in the late 1980s, when only Euros 4.3bn were invested at the peak of the cycle. Bourdais Insignia show that cross-border investors have been dominating the French property market, increasing significantly since 1996. In 2001 cross-border investors accounted for 68% of the total (Euros 8.2bn) up from 58% in 2000 (Euros 4.7bn). North Americans and Germans still dominated the French commercial property market with 87% of cross-border investments. Cross-border investors are mainly institutional (54%), or short and medium-term property investment funds (15%).

In France a leading supply-side factor fuelling commercial property investment is large owner-occupiers' sales of property portfolios. Among these, a France Telecom transaction alone amounted to Euros 3 billion, representing more than half of owner-occupied property sales. Such sales have doubled in volume since 2000, reaching Euros 5.4bn and 45% of total sales in 2001.

The corporate viewpoint: the financial motivations for property outsourcing

In accordance with the principles of shareholder value management, a principal objective of the company is to optimise its shareholders' returns. Value creation requires an acceptance that equity is not a free resource and that it is worth at least the opportunity cost of an alternative investment for the same level of risk.

Pressure on capital efficiency is forcing companies to consider outsourcing their real estate portfolios and functions. The main strategic levers are identified through their potential to increase shareholder value:

- The use of off-balance sheet financing structures, such as sales and leasebacks of real estate, lead to the reduction of fixed assets on the balance sheet and improve financial ratios.
- Increasing profit and operating results by reducing costs and improving efficiency by concentrating on productive and core corporate activities. Non-core activities should be outsourced.
- Shareholder value can be enhanced by reducing the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). This may be achieved through leverage when debt interest rates are lower than the equity cost.

As corporate real estate represents an important part of the balance sheet, property and facilities outsourcing is expected to enhance shareholder value. (Financial Times Survey, 2001)

The main reasons lying behind the large property outsourcing deals which have recently come about in Europe are thus firstly financial - outsourcing enables companies to generate revenue - and secondly to increase flexibility and operational efficiency.

Listed below are the key financial motives put forward by companies for divesting the management and ownership of the buildings they occupy:

Benefits to the Balance Sheet : improving financial ratios

Most often the move to outsource huge corporate real estate portfolios via sale and leaseback is regarded by companies facing large debts as a way of improving the balance sheet, reducing gearing ratios, raising cash and improving financial ratios. This applies to most European telecoms companies, which in the last few years have made massive investments in technological innovation and are now under pressure from financial markets and from debt rating agencies to stabilise their balance sheets.

Selling corporate property reduces fixed assets on balance sheets, improves all profit ratios, and reduces gearing. By increasing the return on asset ratio a company makes its balance sheet more attractive for many analysts for

investment and lending purposes. Moreover, as analysts view real estate assets as illiquid in the short term, property divestment can be very attractive for quoted companies.

Such improvements in profit ratios allow companies:

- to finance their activity at lower rates and costs, without any effect on their debt rating;
- to reduce debt and open up other sources of finance on better terms without resorting to stock or debt markets.

Significant fiscal advantages may also arise from property outsourcing, as sale and leaseback may result in lease payments becoming income tax-deductible. Rental charges are considered as operating costs and are accounted for in the income statement, are taken into the overall result and reduce the corporate tax burden.

Sources of funding: raising capital at a lower cost than one's competitors

Outsourcing and off-balance-sheet financing in general should allow companies to diversify financing sources and raise capital at lower cost, without recourse to the stock or debt markets and without affecting credit ratings. Benefits are also gained by companies with relatively bad credit ratings, since property is removed from the balance sheet, enabling the company to increase its financing quotity.

Financing through securitisation implies the sale of future financial flows such as rent. Using a Special Purpose Vehicle enables the investor to isolate the risk of the real estate from the issuer's credit risk. Securitisation usually achieves an AAA or AA rating, which is inaccessible to most traditional companies.

Generating value through outsourcing and freeing up cash to create greater liquidity

Another motive for outsourcing real estate assets is to realise the value locked into such portfolios and thereby release funds for core activities.

However, outsourcing deals take a long time to complete: France Telecom's outsourcing deal, for example, took 8 months, while BT's deal took 18 months.

Typically, huge corporate property portfolios have been held for a long time and have a low historical cost base. This has led to significant gains on any sale, given the buoyant state of property markets in recent years.

The financial limits of outsourcing operations.

The gross operating surplus and operating income are reduced by outsourcing, as rents include both costs of financing and depreciation of assets. Outsourcing has an immediate impact on the financial results of a company and therefore on its equity. These effects must be taken into account, as they can make future capital investment appear unattractive.

The impact on the net result and on the stockholder's equity depends largely on the financial arrangement. A company must arbitrate between the discounted rent that it agrees to pay in the future and the current price at which it agrees to sell its assets. Realising maximum value and cash today will mean paying rents substantially higher than the long-term average.

Financial analysts will be aware of the significance of this kind of operation, and may reintegrate them implicitly into their analyses. Although seldom changing their recommendations, they may be mentioned in the global risk analysis of the company in question. Ratings agencies systematically include securitisation or leaseback sales in the company's balance sheet. Furthermore, they will issue a negative rating if a significant part of the financing of a group is done through these types of operation (20%) because they consider that the quality of the accounts has been affected. These operations reduce the possibility of recovering value from assets if a company defaults on payments to creditors as sound assets have been moved off the balance sheet.

The strategic and real estate motives

Focussing on the company's Core Business

By focussing on its core business the company gains a clearer view of its comparative advantage. It can re-organise its value chains, focus its activities on the most profitable business segments and enhance the value of its expertise compared to its competitors. It thereby increases its own market share and accordingly adds shareholder value.

Moreover, such a strategy allows the company to transfer risks which are not associated with its core business to a service provider who is better placed to take on property risk as this is his area of expertise.

Management of property and operational flexibility

Outsourcing property management and the corporate real estate function provide greater occupational flexibility and potential for rationalising property

operation costs. Large mergers in recent years have tended to leave companies with considerable excess space, as their staffing levels are likely to fall over time.

Outsourcing may be a way of re-organising property management and making savings in running costs. This will be more likely for a tenant than an owner-occupier, as the former will be more inclined to leave a rented property for more suitable premises.

The behaviour of the real estate user will change depending on whether he is a tenant or an owner-occupier. A tenant is more likely to optimise the use of space to keep down operational costs per employee.

Occupiers increasingly demand flexibility in the way they use space, and utilising the rental market can often ensure they obtain accommodation of the right size and in the right location to meet the changing needs of their businesses.

Another outcome is that information concerning real estate should become clearer, leading to more efficient post-transaction management. Real estate costs are more likely to be kept under control when the company is the tenant.

References

Arthur ANDERSEN, ROBERTSON Ronald and SCOTT Andrew, *Property securitisation in the UK*, RICS, 2000.

ATHIS REAL, *Property Market*, 2001.

AUDIT COMMISSION, *Building for the future. The management of procurement under the private finance intiative*, London, 2001.

AUDIT COMMISSION, *Hot property, getting the best from local authority assets*, London, 2000.

Bank for International Settlements, *68th annual report*, 1998.

DIETL Helmut.*, Capital markets and corporate governance in Japan, Germany and the United States*, Routledge, London, 1998.

FINANCIAL TIMES SURVEY, “Europe follows US trend for outsourcing”, *Financial Times*, April 27, 2001.

GEHRKE Ingmar, « Valeur actionnaire : le rattrapage de l’Allemagne », in PLIHON D. et PONSSARD J-P.*, La montée en puissance des fonds d’investissement, quels enjeux pour les entreprises ?,* La Documentation française, 2002.

Insignia BOURDAIS, *The French Commercial real estate market*, 2001.

JEFFERS Esther et MAGNIER Véronique, « Le gouvernement d'entreprise et les FIE au niveau international », in PLIHON D. et PONSSARD J-P.*, La montée en puissance des fonds d'investissement, quels enjeux pour les entreprises ?,* La Documentation française, 2002.

JONES LANG LASALLE*, European Capital Markets*, London, October 2001.

Kimbler B., Rutherford R., 1993, « Corporate Real Estate Outsourcing : A survey of the Issues », *The Journal of Real Estate Research*, 8 (4), 525-540.

LB, International Property Advisers, *Notes on the Italian Propertty Market*, Milano.

MANNING Chris, ROULAC Stephen E. « Corporate Real Estate Research within the Academy », *Journal of Real Estate Research,* vol. 17, n°3, 1999.

Miles M., Pringle J., Webb B.,1989, « Modeling the Corporate Real Estate Decision », *The Journal of Real Estate Research*, 4 (3), 47-66.

MORIN François, *Le modèle français de détention et de gestion du capital*, Les éditions de Bercy, Coll. Etudes, Paris, juin 1998.

MUMFORD Michael, « Extending the Private Finance Initiative », *Accounting & Business,* February, 1998, pp. 32-33.

Nappi-Choulet I., 1999, *Marketing et stratégie de l'immobilier*, Dunod, Paris.

Noha E.,1993, « Benchmarking : the Search for Best practices in Corporate Real Estate », *The Journal of Real Estate Research*, 8 (4), 511-523.

Nourse H., Roulac S.,1993, « Linking Real Estate Decisions to corporate Strategy », *The Journal of Real Estate Research*, 8 (4), 475-494.

OCDE, *Institutional Investors,* Statistical Yearbook, Paris, 2001.

PLIHON Dominique, « Les investisseurs institutionnels, nouveaux acteurs de la finance internationale » in *Cahiers français*, n°289, La Documentation française, Parus, janvier-février 1999.

POLLERT William and GLICKMAN Edwin, « Optimizing shareowner value from corporate real estate assets », *Strategic Finance*, vol. 82, 10, 2001.

ROULAC Stephen E., « Corporate Property Strategy is Integral to Corporate Business Stategy », *Journal of Real Estate Research*, vol. 22, n°1/2, 2001.

ROULAC Stephen E., « Real Estate Value Chain Connections : Tangible and Transparent », *Journal of Real Estate Research*, vol. 17, n°3, 1999.

ROULAC Stephen, ADAIR Alastair, McGreal Stanley, BERRY, BROW N and HEANEY, « Corporate Real Estate : A Profile of the leading comanies in Ireland », *Journal of Real Estate Literature*, Vol. 10, n°1, 2002.

SG Securities, *Thriving or just surviving on the stock market*, Property Sector Update, March 2002.

SIRMANS C-F., *Real Estate Finance*, Mc Graw-Hill, 2nd edition, 1989.